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Abstract. A fundamental task in reputation systems is to aggregate
multiple feedback ratings into a single value that can be used to com-
pare the reputation of different entities. Feedback is most commonly
aggregated using the arithmetic mean. However, the mean is quite sus-
ceptible to outliers and biases, and thus may not be the most informative
aggregate of the reports. We consider three criteria to assess the qual-
ity of an aggregator: the informativeness, the robustness and the strat-
egyproofness, and analyze how different aggregators, in particular the
mean, weighted mean, median and mode, perform with respect to these
criteria. The results show that the arithmetic mean may not always be
the best choice.
1 Introduction
Many sites on the world wide web offer people the possibility to share their ex-
periences with products and services through reviews and ratings. This feedback
helps people avoid bad choices, drives them towards more useful products, and
brings more revenue to good producers. They are an important part of the user’s
decision making when buying goods or services.
We consider in particular reputation and rating systems for products and
services, such as those operated by Amazon.com, Tripadvisor, and many other
electronic commerce sites. These have the following characteristics:
– they collect ratings for individual well-identified products or services, and
aggregate these ratings into a single score;
– the identity of raters does not have to be known;
– raters act to influence the score of the item they rate to make it as close
as possible to the value they consider best. Note that this value might not
reflect the true quality if the rater is not honest.
A common reflex for users of such sites is to order the choices according to
their ratings, and only consider those that are at the top of such rankings. Such
an order is usually obtained by aggregating individual feedback scores into a
single value that establishes an ordering of the alternatives. The most common
way of aggregating ratings is by the arithmetic mean, but one can also consider
aggregation using the weighted mean, the median and the mode.
In unbiased normal distributions, there is little difference between these ag-
gregators. However, it is known that in reality, reviews are often biased [7].
Writing a review or even just leaving a rating requires effort, and since it is vol-
untary many of these ratings are left by people who have some ulterior motive
or extreme opinion. One can thus observe that the distribution of ratings is far
from the normal distribution one would expect from an unbiased population of
raters. This means that the different ways of aggregating them can give very
different results.
In this paper, we consider how the aggregation method influences the quality
of the ranking. We evaluate quality using the following three criteria:
– informativeness, i.e. how likely is it that the ranking that a user finds at the
time of making a choice will still be the ranking when the user is using the
product or service;
– robustness, i.e. how easy is it for the ranking to be distorted by outliers or
malicious reviews;
– strategyproofness, i.e. for a rater who wants the average ranking to be a
certain value, is it best to report this value or manipulate the aggregation
by reporting differently.
We compare four different ways of aggregating n numerical ratings r1, ..., rn,
using different forms of averaging:
– the mean is the arithmetic mean ra =
1
n
∑n
i=1 ri.
– the weighted mean is the same as the arithmetic mean but with weights:
rw =
∑
n
i=1
w(i)ri∑
n
i=1
w(i)
, where w(i) is the weight function.
– the median is the smallest value rd such that half of the values are ≥ rd and
half of the values are ≤ rd, i.e. there exist X ⊂ {r1, .., rn} and Y ⊂ {r1, .., rn}
such that (∀ri ∈ X)ri ≤ rd and (∀ri ∈ Y )ri ≥ rd and ||X| − |Y || ≤ 1.
– the mode is the smallest value ro which occurs most frequently as a rating,
i.e. for any r′ 6= ro, |{ri|ri = ro}| ≥ |{ri|ri = r
′}|.
Both the median and the mode require a tie-breaking rule. When two values
are possible, we select the smallest one. Moreover, it happens that two items
have the same aggregated value. In that case, we use the number of reviews as
a tie-breaking rule to make the final ranking.
We examine the reviews given on an actual review site and observe that the
four notions of average differ significantly. In particular, the mode and median
tend to be more robust to outliers and biased reviews than the mean and the
weighted mean, and thus may be more informative for a user.
In this paper, we first present an analysis of the four different notions with
respect to their robustness, and show that they have very different properties. We
then analyze their behavior on data taken from an actual review web site, and
show that they lead to very different rankings and also very different behavior
of the rankings over time. In particular, our results suggest that the mean may
not be the most informative way of aggregating ratings since the ranking shown
to a user is often very unstable.
2 Related Work
There are many reputation mechanisms that follow the model we assume in this
paper. They can differ significantly in the way they aggregate and display rep-
utation information to the users. Some mechanisms accumulate all reports into
a reputation score that may potentially grow forever. eBay3 and RentACoder4
are two commercial sites where part of the reputation information is given by
scores that reflect the total number of positive or negative interactions reported
for an agent.
Amazon5 or the popular movie review database IMDB6 rank products by
the arithmetic mean of ratings. They also publish histograms of the ratings7 but
the richer information is more difficult to find through the normal user interface,
and is not used in any way for ranking the alternatives.
Tripadvisor8 ranks hotels from cities around the world. The hotels are sorted
by ”popularity”, defined here as the arithmetic mean of ratings. The reviews for
a given hotel are ordered from the most recent to the oldest. Only 10 reviews
are listed per page and contain information about the author (date, username,
location of the reviewer) and the overall rating with a textual comment. The
user has to click on the review to see more details.
Other mechanisms use discrete values for reputation information and define
clear rules describing how sets of feedback are mapped to reputation values. The
popular IT news site Slashdot9 uses karma levels (i.e., terrible, bad, neutral, pos-
itive, good, and excellent) that characterize the quality of the news submissions
posted by a user so far. Likewise, eBay sellers also have labels (e.g., power seller)
that they can gain by meeting certain conditions.
The robustness of the reputation mechanism has also been an important con-
cern of the research community. [5] discuss the risks associated with cheap online
pseudonyms (i.e., users can easily create several online identities) and conclude
that in any reputation mechanism newcomers must start with the lowest possible
reputation. This property is later used by [3] to design moral hazard reputation
mechanisms that are robust to identity changes.
[2] describes general techniques for making online feedback mechanisms im-
mune to manipulation. A theoretical study of opinion manipulation is presented
in [4], with the striking conclusion that manipulation can both increase and
3 www.ebay.com
4 www.rentacoder.com
5 www.amazon.com
6 www.imdb.com
7 In addition, IMDB correlates demographics information with the histogram of scores.
8 www.tripadvisor.com
9 www.slashdot.org
decrease the information value of online forums. Other works addressing the
robustness of the reputation information are [12] and [1].
[10] and [8] discuss general mechanisms for making reputation mechanisms
incentive compatible. The idea is to reward the agents for reporting feedback
such that the expected reward is maximized by being honest. [9] extends this
idea to mechanisms that are also collusion resistant.
Our work differs from the above results in several important ways. First,
we are looking at typical review forums where the social network of a user is
unknown, and most users submit only one review. Second, we are looking at sin-
gle value aggregators of reputation information, that can be easily understood
and used by normal users to rank alternatives. Finally, we consider actual re-
views and study how different information aggregators affect key properties like
robustness, informativeness and strategyproofness.
3 Empirical Study
We consider feedbacks from a popular travel site that collects reviews of hotels
from users around the world. The reviews contain a textual comment with a
title, an overall rating and numerical ratings from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest) for
different features such as cleanliness, service, location, etc. The site provides
ranking of hotels according to their location. Like most of the reputation sites,
it aggregates reviews into a single value for each hotel and, based on that value,
sorts hotels in ascending order. It uses a simple arithmetic mean on the overall
ratings to recommend hotels.
We selected four cities for this study: Boston, Las Vegas, New York and
Sydney. For each city, we took the first 100 hotels that have the highest number
of reviews. Table 1 shows for each city the number of reviews and the distribution
of hotels with respect to the star-rating provided by the website. Hotels that do
not have a star-rating are classified as ’NA’. All data were collected by crawling
the website in July 2007.
Table 1. A summary of the data set.
City # Reviews # of Hotels with NA, 1, 2, 3, 4 & 5 stars
Boston 5537 17, 2, 4, 23, 15, 5
Las Vegas 28017 19, 8, 18, 31, 17, 7
New York 29123 16, 9, 12, 35, 24, 4
Sydney 3629 41, 0, 1, 29, 19, 10
4 Robustness
In this section, we present an analysis of four aggregators, namely the mean,
the weighted mean, the median and the mode, inspired by the robust statistics
theory. Robust statistics aim at analyzing and suggesting estimators that are
unaffected by small deviations from the model assumptions. Interested readers
may refer to [6] [14] for additional informations.
For this analysis, we quantify how robust aggregators are against outliers and
malicious reports. In order to assess the quality of each aggregator, we define
the breakdown point as a measure of this robustness. The breakdown point is
the proportion of manipulated ratings required to make the aggregator return
an arbitrary value.
Definition 1. Let {r1, ..., rn−l, r
′
1, ..., r
′
l} be a sample of n reviews where r
′
i are
outliers. The finite-sample breakdown point ǫ of an aggregator r is the smallest
proportion l
n
for which the set {r′1, ..., r
′
l} will cause r to be unbounded.
Definition 2. The breakdown point ǫ∗ is the limit of the finite-sample break-
down point as n goes to infinity.
This definition provides a tool to measure the robustness of every estimator.
The higher the breakdown point, the more robust the estimator is. However, the
breakdown point cannot exceed 0.5 because if more than half of the ratings are
outliers, it is not possible anymore to distinguish the underlying distribution of
the outliers. We will see in the next sections that two aggregators achieve this
upper bound.
4.1 Mean and Weighted Mean
Let {r1, ..., rn−l, r
′
1, ..., r
′
l} be the set of ratings for a given hotel h. r
′
i are the
outliers. We define the mean by
ra =
1
n
(
n−l∑
i=1
ri +
l∑
i=1
r′i) (1)
One outlier is enough to change the value of the mean. Thus, the finite-sample
breakdown point of the mean is ǫ = 1
n
. The breakdown point is ǫ∗ = limn→∞
1
n
=
0. The mean is extremely sensitive to outliers.
In this study, the ratings are bounded and we need more than one outlier
to significantly alter the mean and thus the ranking. For that reason, we would
like to quantify how many outliers are required to change the ranking of hotel
hj from position j to position i. Consider a hotel hi with n ratings of mean ri.
We add k outliers with mean r′. How many outliers are needed to have a new
mean lower or equal to the mean rj of another hotel hj? That is
nri + kr
′
n+ k
≤ rj (2)
After reordering, we get
k ≥
n(ri − rj)
rj − r
′
(3)
For instance, if we want to set the mean to 4 of a hotel with n = 100 ratings
and mean r = 4.5 by only adding lowest ratings of ’1’, then we need k ≥ 17
outliers.
The weighted mean is similar to the simple mean except that ratings have as-
signed weights and some contribute more than others. Let {r′1, ..., r
′
l, r1, ..., rn−l}
be the set of ratings sorted from the most recent to the oldest for a given hotel
h. The weighted mean is
rw =
∑l
i=1 w(i)r
′
i +
∑n−l
i=1 w(i+ l)ri∑n
i=1 w(i)
(4)
The weights do not change the breakdown point and remains the same as
the simple mean. Note that the mean is a special case of the weighted mean
where the weights are all equal to 1. Obviously, the number of outliers needed
to change the ranking of a hotel is upper bounded by Equation 3 and depends
on the weight function w(i).
4.2 Median
The median is the rating rd separating the lower half from the upper half of a set
of ratings. Let {r1, ..., rn−m, r
′
1, ..., r
′
m} be the set of ratings sorted in ascending
order for a given hotel h. r′i are the outliers. If n is odd, that is n = 2l + 1, the
median is located at (l + 1)/n. Recall that if n is even, i.e. n = 2l, we take the
value at l.
To find the breakdown point, we determine the proportion of outliers required
to change the value of the median. The finite-sample breakdown point is given
by
ǫ =
{
l+1
n
= 12 +
1
2n , n = 2l + 1
l
n
= 12 , n = 2l
(5)
Therefore, the breakdown point is ǫ∗ = limn→∞ ǫ =
1
2 . The median is thus
a robust aggregation function because it involves only the location and not the
value of the ratings. To find the number of outliers required to change the ranking
of a given hotel h with n ratings, we add k outliers to the ratings of h. In the worst
case scenario, k should be at least equal to n+1. The first outlier determines the
value of the median and thus the rank. For instance, if we want to change the
median of a hotel that has 100 ratings, we need at least 101 malicious ratings
and the new median is given by the first malicious ratings we introduce.
4.3 Mode
The mode, denoted ro, is another aggregation function and is equal to the rating
that occurs the most frequently. That is, for any r′ 6= ro,
|{ri|ri = ro}| ≥ |{ri|ri = r
′}| (6)
Let m and l be the number of identical ratings r1 and r2 respectively, m 6= l.
Obviously, if the mode is the rating r1, then m > l. Therefore, m ≥ l+1. Thus,
the finite-sample breakdown point of the mode is equal to ((n/2) + 1)/n for
n = m + l ratings. It follows that the breakdown point ǫ∗ = 12 . From the same
reasoning, we need k = n + 1 outliers of the same value to change the mode.
For instance, if a hotel as a mode ro = 4 with n = 100 ratings (of ’4’), k = 101
outliers are required to change that mode.
5 Empirical Results
It is well-known that distributions of reports are far from normal due to reporting
biases [7]. Aggregators such as the mean, median and mode have relatively the
same value for normal distributions. However, they should have a significant dif-
ference for non-normal distributions. To support this hypothesis, we conducted
the following experiment. For each of the four cities considered in our study, we
computed a full ranking of the hotels according to each of the four aggregators
explained in Section 1. Then, for every pair of aggregators we measured the dis-
tance between the corresponding orderings of hotels within a city. To measure
the distance between the two rankings we chose the average absolute difference
between the position of the same hotel in the two rankings.
For the weighted mean, we use Equation 7 as the weight function that is
directly inspired by the logistic function applied in regression models. With this
function (see Fig. 1), recent ratings have a high weight and the weight decreases
while the rating is getting older. We use the following logit model for the rele-
vance and thus the weight of a rating as a function of its order:
w(i) =
0.9
1 + eβ(i−µ)
+ 0.1 (7)
Such logit models are commonly believed to be good models for probabilities
that vary over time or space.
The results are presented in Table 2. For example, the rank of a hotel in
Boston varies on the average with 7.7 positions (up or down) when the ranking
is done according to the median instead of the mean. Likewise, the rank of a
hotel in New York varies with an average of 16.9 positions (up or down) when
the ranking considers the mode instead of the mean.
The average difference of ranks triggered by different aggregators is quite
high: 8 to 17 ranks10. Considering that most feedback websites display only the
first 5 or 10 ”best” items, the results of Table 2 show that different aggregators
can completely change the list of candidates suggested to the users. It therefore
becomes important to better understand the properties of each aggregator.
10 The only exception is the tuple mean - weighted mean. The two aggregators are
conceptually very close, therefore the rankings span by them are also similar.
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Fig. 1. The weight function: recent ratings (low index) get a highest weight. Note that
the age is not related to the time but to the most recent rating.
Table 2. Average difference of ranking for the three aggregator functions.
Boston Las Vegas New York Sydney average
mean - median 7.788 13.480 11.480 9.100 10.462
mean - mode 9.939 15.100 16.980 11.420 13.360
mean - weighted mean 2.394 2.760 5.480 1.340 2.993
median - mode 10.182 16.140 16.860 10.340 13.380
median - weighted mean 8.333 13.460 12.600 9.600 10.998
mode - weighted mean 10.848 15.740 17.940 11.700 14.057
5.1 Informativeness
In a reputation system, the goal of the aggregator is to reflect the user’s reviews
into one value. One assumption of aggregator is that users have reported their
true experience. However, it is often not the case. For instance, the ratings are
often part of discussion threads where past reviews influence future reports by
creating prior expectations [13]. Therefore we can ask how an aggregator will
continue to correctly reflect users’ opinion. In Table 3, we look at the stability
of each aggregator by counting the number of rankings that deviate by more
than two ranks from the final ranking. The median is the most stable aggregator
with two cities. However, the weighted mean seems more stable on average. The
median follows closely. Then the mode and the mean come after.
As an example, Figure 2 provides the evolution of ranking and rating by the
incoming reviews for a New York hotel. If we look at the mean aggregator only,
when the rating decreases, the hotel loses ranks. However, around the 120th
review, the rating increases and thus the hotel is going up in the global ranking.
Although the median and the mode have a fixed value for the rating, the rank
oscillates a little bit for the first reviews to stabilize very quickly. We observe
such behavior for most of the hotels in our database.
Table 3. Average number of ranking that deviate from the final ranking with more
than 2 ranks. In bold, the lowest value. The significance levels are computed with a
one-way analysis of variance.
Boston Las Vegas New York Sydney
Weighted mean 29.606 154.640 96.660 23.450
Mean 45.833 227.120 156.930 28.460
Median 23.652 189.770 91.870 12.760
Mode 29.758 254.170 73.550 17.330
p-value 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000
5.2 Robustness
Finally, we look at the robustness of each aggregator by taking the number of
outliers required to alter the ranking of a given hotel. For each hotel, we inject
outliers with the highest possible ratings, i.e. 5, until the rank changes. Table
4 summarizes the results for each city. Two reviews are enough to change the
rank when the aggregator is the weighted mean, around 5 for the mean while the
median and mode need 20 and 15 outliers respectively. The mean and weighted
mean can be changed with a very low number of additional ratings. However,
the mode, and in particular the median require a relatively large number of
additional ratings, and are thus more difficult to manipulate.
Table 4. Average number of outliers (with highest ratings ’5’) required to alter the
ranking. In bold, the highest value. The significance levels are computed with a one-way
analysis of variance.
Boston Las Vegas New York Sydney
Weighted mean 1.922 2.153 2.155 1.464
Mean 3.328 5.102 8.041 1.948
Median 10.297 40.602 22.639 3.639
Mode 9.047 23.867 22.309 3.691
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
6 Strategyproofness
Besides influencing the conclusions that are drawn from a given set of ratings,
the way that ratings are aggregated can also have an influence on the reports
that users will submit. In this section, we consider to what degree users have an
incentive to report a rating that differs from their true perception in order to
manipulate the ranking.
We make the assumption that a rater has a single most preferred score that
she would like to see as the aggregated score of the item being rated. For an
honest rater, this value should be the true perception of quality. We furthermore
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Fig. 2. A New York hotel
assume that when it is not possible to make the aggregated score take this
most preferred score, the rater would like to bring it as close as possible to it.
In the language of decision theory, this means that raters have a single-peaked
preference profile: their preference for different ratings has a single peak at their
most preferred score and drops monotonically to both sides of it.
Now consider the rating that such a user should report to best achieve its ob-
jective. In a strategyproof reputation system, a rater can expect the best possible
outcome by reporting her most preferred score.11 However, this is not always
the case. For example, if a product currently has 5 reports with an arithmetic
mean of 4, and the rater would like to see a score of 3, then it would be best
off to report 1 and drive the mean to 3.5 rather than 3 and obtain a mean of
3.833. We believe that such manipulation strategies are the source of much of
the reporting bias we can observe in practical reputation sites, and we conjecture
that much more useful information could be obtained if the systems were indeed
strategyproof.
Definition 3. An aggregation function is strategyproof (or truthful) if there is
no incentive for any of the reviewers to lie about or hide their private valuation.
11 Note that this does not have to be the true quality.
6.1 Mean and Weighted Mean
The mean and the weighted mean are not strategyproof. Consider that the re-
viewers are sorted in order of their private opinions. Let r¯ be the mean (or
weighted mean). Any reviewer aj with a private opinion below the mean has the
incentive to submit an exaggerated negative review in order to push the mean
downwards. Likewise, a rater with a private opinion higher than the mean has
the incentive to submit an exaggerated positive review.
6.2 Median
Moulin proves that, when preferences are single-peaked along the real line, the
median is the only strategyproof preference aggregation scheme [11]. Assume
that the reviewers {a1, ..., an} are sorted increasingly according to their private
opinion of a hotel A. Let ri be the private opinion of the reviewer ai, so ri+1 ≥
ri. Let r
∗ denote the median rating, corresponding to reviewer ai∗ . Obviously,
reviewer ai∗ should not deviate. If a reviewer aj with j < i
∗ misreports a lower
value than rj the median rating will not change. Misreporting a value higher
than rj , on the other hand, can only increase the median, and therefore make
the public reputation of the hotel even further from aj ’s private opinion. The
same argument applies for any reviewer aj with j > i
∗. As long as the tie-
breaking is independent of the reviews, then the same argument holds even if
there is an even number of raters in the system.
In addition, Moulin ([11]) also shows that aggregation through the median
is Pareto optimal and anonymous.
6.3 Mode
The mode is not strategyproof. Assume that two reviewers have the same private
opinion r1 and three reviewers have same private opinion r2 > r1. Let aj be a
reviewer whose private opinion is rj < r1. If the reviewer misreports and submits
a review with the value r1 she has successfully modified the public reputation of
the hotel from r2 to r1, which is a better outcome for aj .
7 Conclusion
We considered different ways of aggregating ratings, in particular the mean,
weighted mean, median and mode. All review sites that we are aware of aggre-
gate ratings by taking their mean, and if ratings were unbiased and normally
distributed the different notions would not differ much. However, in actual review
sites there are many biases, and the three methods give very different results.
In hindsight, we find it surprising that other ways of forming averages have not
been considered.
We considered three criteria: informativeness as reflected by the degree to
which the ranking fluctuates over time, robustness as reflected by the number
of reports necessary to change the aggregate, and strategyproofness as reflected
by the incentive to file truthful reports to move the average as close to them as
possible.
On all three criteria, the mean seems to be the worst way of aggregating
rankings: it changes the most frequently, it is the least robust, and it is not strat-
egyproof. While the weighted mean is in general more informative, the median
is significantly more robust. Finally, only the median is strategyproof. Strate-
gyproofness may greatly increase the quality of rating information that is col-
lected, provided that raters actually understand it. This would be an interesting
subject for a user study.
We thus conclude that for using reputation sites to help users in their choices,
aggregation through the median or mode are likely to be better choices than the
mean. However, we recognize that if the purpose of the reputation system is
to encourage good quality, i.e. to deal with the moral hazard problem, it may
actually be desirable for raters to be able to move the ranking easily. The two
aspects should be weighed by the designer of a reputation system.
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